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ABSTRACT: Recent studyoncertificateless authenticated key agreement focuses on bilinear 
pairing-freecertificateless authenticated key agreement protocol. Yet it has got limitations in 
the aspect of computational amount.So it is important to reduce the number of the scalar 
multiplication over elliptic curve group in bilinear pairing-free protocols. This paper 
proposed a new bilinear pairing-freecertificatelesstwo-party authenticated key agreement 
protocol, providing more efficiency among related work and proofunder the random oracle 
model. 
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1. Introduction 
Introduction of mobile devices including mobile phones, laptops and etc. has made human life 
more comfortable. However, it has also brought urgent problems to be solved in the 
communication through insecure channels. 
Al-Riyami and Paterson [1]introduced a new certificateless public key cryptography 
(CLPKC).CLPKCavoidedthe certificate management problems in the traditional public key 
cryptosystem (PKC) and the inherent key escrow problem in the identity-based(ID-based) public 
key cryptosystem[2]. The CLPKCis intermediate between the traditional PKC and ID-based 
cryptosystem. In a certificateless cryptosystem,a user’s private key is not generated by the key 
generationcenter(KGC) alone. Instead, it consists of a partialprivate key generated by the KGC 
and some secret value chosen by the user. Thus, the KGC isunable to obtain the user’s private 
key in such a way that the key escrow problem can be solved.Intuitively, CLPKC has nice 
features borrowed from both ID-based cryptography and traditionalPKC. It alleviates the key 
escrow problem in ID-based cryptography and at the same time reducesthe cost and simplifies 
the use of the technology when compared with traditional PKC. 
Following the pioneering work due to Al-Riyami and Paterson, several certificatelesstwo-
party authenticated key agreement (CTAKA) protocols[3–6] have been proposed. All theabove 
CTAKA protocolsmay be practical, but they are from bilinear pairings. The relative 
computation cost of apairing is approximately 20 times higher than that of the scalar 
multiplication over elliptic curvegroup [7]. 
Therefore, CTAKA protocolswithout bilinear pairings would be more appealing in termsof 
efficiency.The severalbilinear pairing-free CTAKA protocols have beenproposed [8, 9, 10, 11, 
12, 19].Yang et al [10] pointed out that neither Geng et al. [8]’s protocol nor Hou et al. [9]’s 
protocol is secure. They proposed an improvedCTAKA protocol to improve the security. He et 
al [11] also proposed abilinear pairing-free CTAKA protocol but it is vulnerable to thetype 1 
adversary [12, 20]. Bellare et al. [13] is the first to propose a formal security model for 
authentication and key distribution. Since then, there have been several extensions[14, 15, 16] 
given to the model. Among them, the modified Bellare-Rogaway (mBR) model [13] and the 
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Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) model [16]are regarded as promising ones. In 2007,LaMacchia et al [17] 
presented a considerably strong security model—the extended Canetti-Krawczyk (eCK) model. 
The eCK model captures many desirable security properties including key-compromise 
impersonation (KCI) resilience, weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS) and ephemeral secrets 
reveal resistance etc. while the originalCK model does notcover KCI attacks.  
From the description of the eCK model for CTAKA protocolin the following section 2.6, one 
can know that the previous bilinear pairing-free CTAKA protocols [8, 9, 11,12] are not secure in 
the eCK model. The protocols [10, 19]are provably secure in the eCK model. However, the user 
in protocols [10, 19] needs 9 and 5 elliptic curve scalar multiplications to finish the key 
agreement.Then it is necessary to design efficient bilinear pairing-free CTAKA protocol, which 
is provably secure in the eCK model.  
In this paper, with the purpose of reducing the amount of computation, we shall propose an 
efficient bilinear pairing-free CTAKA scheme and prove our protocol is provably secure under 
the eCK model. 
The remainder of this paper is organized follows. The section 2 gives some preliminaries. Our 
new protocol is given in the section 3. The security analysis of the proposed protocol is 
presented in the section 4. In the section 5, we compare our scheme with previous protocols. 
Finally, in the section 6 we provide some conclusions. 
 
2. Preliminaries 
 
2.1 Notations 
For convenience, some notations used in this paper are described as follows. 
z ݌, ݍ: two large prime numbers 
z ܨ௣: prime field 
z ܧ / ܨ௣: an elliptic curve defined over a prime fieldܨ௣ 
z ܩ: the cyclic additive group composed of the point on ܧ / ܨ௣ 
z ܲ: a generator of ܩ 
z ܪଵሺ·ሻ: a secure one-way hash function 
z ܪଶሺ·ሻ: a secure one-way hash function 
z ܫܦ௜: the identity of user ݅ 
z ݏ:the master private key of the KGC 
z ௄ܲீ஼: the public key of the KGC 
z ݎ௜: the KGC’s ephemeralprivate key 
z ܦ௜: the user ݅’s partial private key 
z ݔ௜: the user ݅’s secret value 
z ௜ܵ: the user ݅’s private key 
z ௜ܲ: the user ݅’s public key 
z ݐ௜:the user ݅’s ephemeral private key 
z ௜ܶ: the user ݅’s ephemeral public key 
z ݇: the security parameter 
z ݌ܽݎܽ݉ݏ: the system parameter 
 
2.2 Process in configuring a new key agreement protocol 
The process in configuring the new protocol and proving its security comes in following steps. 
a) Provide a computational hardness problem. 
b) Provide the security model of the new protocol. 
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c) Provide the new protocol. 
d) Provide a provable security in the security model. 
¾ Provide a formal definition of the goals of the protocol. 
¾ Reduce the advantage of the adversary against the protocol to solving of the 
computational hardness problems. 
¾ Prove the security of the protocol in the way of deriving the contradiction of the above 
assumption. 
 
2.3Computational hardness problem 
The following problems defined over ܩ are assumed to be intractable within polynomial time. 
¾ Discrete Logarithm (DL) problem: For ܽ אோ ܼ௤כ  and ܲ  the generator of ܩ , given 
ሺܲ, ܽ · ܲሻ, compute ܽ. 
¾ Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: For ܽ, ܾ, ܿ אோ ܼ௤כ  and ܲ the generator 
of ܩ, given ሺܲ, ܽ · ܲ, ܾ · ܲሻ, compute ܾܽ · ܲ. 
¾ Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem: For ܽ, ܾ, ܿ אோ ܼ௤כ and ܲ the generator of ܩ, 
given ሺܲ, ܽ · ܲ, ܾ · ܲ, ܿ · ܲሻ, decide whether ܾܽ · ܲ ൌ ܿ · ܲ or not. 
¾ Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem: For ܽ, ܾ, ܿ אோ ܼ௤כ  and ܲ  the generator of ܩ , 
givenሺܲ, ܽ · ܲ, ܾ · ܲ, ܿ · ܲሻ,  computeܾܽ · ܲ ,along with full access to a decision oracle 
DDH. 
The GDH assumption states that the probability of any polynomial-time algorithm to solve 
the GDH problem is negligible. 
 
2.4 Desirable Security Properties for two-party authenticated key agreement protocols 
The following security properties are commonly required for two-party authenticated key 
agreement protocols: 
¾ Resistance to Basic Impersonation Attacks (BIS): An adversary who does not know the 
private key of party ܣ should not be able to impersonate ܣ. 
¾ Resistance to Unknown Key-Share (UKS) Attacks: It should be impossible to coerce ܣ 
into thinking it is sharing a key with ܤ, when it is actually sharing a key with another 
(honest) user ܥ (and ܥ correctly thinks the key is shared with ܣ). 
¾ Known Key Security (KKS): Each run of a key agreement protocol between two 
partiesܣand ܤshould produce a unique session key. A protocol should not become 
insecure if the adversary has learned some of the session keys. 
¾ Resistance to Key-Compromise Impersonation (KCI) Attacks: If the private key of a user 
ܣis compromised, the attacker should not be able to impersonate another user ܤ to ܣ. 
¾ Weak Perfect Forward Secrecy (WPFS): An attacker who knows the private keys of all 
parties, but is not actively involved in choosing ephemeral keys during the sessions of 
interest, should not be able to determine previously established session keys. 
¾ Resistance to Disclosure of Ephemeral Secrets (DES): The protocol should be resistant 
tothe disclosure of ephemeral secrets. The disclosure of an ephemeral secret should not 
compromise the security of other sessions. 
¾ KGC Forward Secrecy (KGC-FS): Certificateless protocols usually require that the KGC 
should be unable to compute previously established session keys even if it knows all 
publicly available information. 
¾ Resistance to Leakage of Ephemeral Secrets to KGC (KGC-LES): In certificateless 
protocols, the KGC that has learned the ephemeral secrets of any session should not be 
able to compute the session key. 
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2.5   CTAKA protocol 
     ACTAKA protocol consists of six polynomial-time algorithms [2-5]: Setup, Partial-Private-
Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key and Key-Agreement. These 
algorithms are respectively defined as follows. 
¾ ܵ݁ݐݑ݌: 
9 Input: k 
9 Output: ݌ܽݎܽ݉ݏ, ݏ 
¾ ܲܽݎݐ݈݅ܽ െ ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ െ ܭ݁ݕ െ ܧݔݐݎܽܿݐ: 
9 Input: ݌ܽݎܽ݉ݏ, ݏ, ܫܦ௜ 
9 Output: ܦ௜ 
¾ ܵ݁ݐ െ ܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐ െ ܸ݈ܽݑ݁: 
9 Input: ݌ܽݎܽ݉ݏ, ܫܦ௜ 
9 Output: ݔ௜ 
¾ ܵ݁ݐ െ ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ െ ܭ݁ݕ: 
9 Input: ݌ܽݎܽ݉ݏ, ܫܦ௜, ݔ௜ 
9 Output: ௜ܵ 
¾ ܵ݁ݐ െ ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿ െ ܭ݁ݕ: 
9 Input: ݌ܽݎܽ݉ݏ, ܫܦ௜, ݔ௜ 
9 Output: ௜ܲ 
¾ ܭ݁ݕ െ ܣ݃ݎ݁݁݉݁݊ݐ: 
9 Input: ሺܫܦ௜, ௜ܵ , ௜ܲሻ, ሺܫܦ௝, ௝ܵ , ௝ܲሻ 
9 Output: ܵܭ௜௝ ൌ ܵܭ௝௜ ൌ ܵܭ 
 
2.6  Security model for CTAKA protocols 
 In CTAKA, as defined in [1], there are two types of adversaries with different capabilities. 
 Definition 1: We say that an adversary is an outside attacker if the adversary does not have 
the KGC’s master secret key. We assume an outside attacker is able to replace public keys of 
users.The outside attacker is called the type 1 adversaryࣛଵ. 
Definition 2: We say that an adversary is an inside attacker if the adversary has access to the 
KGC’s master secret key. We assume an inside attacker cannot replace public keys of users.The 
inside attacker is called the type 2 adversaryࣛଶ. 
Let ܷ ൌ ሼ ଵܷ, ܷଶ,ڮ , ܷ௡ሽ be a set of parties. The protocol may be run between any two of these 
parties. For each party there exists an identity. There is a KGC that issues identity based partial 
private keys to the parties through secure channel. Additionally, the parties generate their own 
secret values and corresponding certificateless public keys. The adversary is in control of the 
network over which protocol messages are exchanged. ∏௧௜,௝  represents the ݐ -th protocol 
session which runs at party  ݅ with intended partner party ݆. A session ∏௧௜,௝  enters an accepted 
state when it computes a session keyܵܭ௜௝௧ . Note that a sessionmay terminate without ever 
entering into an accepted state. The information of whether a session has terminated with 
acceptance or without acceptance is assumed to be public. The session ∏௧௜,௝  is assigned 
apartner ID  ݌݅݀  ൌ   ሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝ሻ. The session ID ݏ݅݀ of ∏௧௜,௝  at party ݅ is the transcript of the 
messages exchanged with party ݆ during the session. Two sessions ∏௧௜,௝  and ∏௟௝,௜  are 
considered matching if they have the same ݌݅݀ and ݏ݅݀. The eCK model in the CLPKC setting 
is defined by the following game between a challenger τ and an adversary ࣛ א ሼࣛଵ,ࣛଶሽ. In 
the model, ࣛ is modeled by a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine (PPT). All 
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communications go through the adversary ࣛ. Participants only respond to the queries by ࣛ and 
do not communicate directly among themselves. ࣛ can relay, modify, delay, interleave or delete 
all the message flows in the system. ࣛ may ask a polynomial number of the following queries 
as follows. 
The game runs in two phases.  
During the phase of the game, the adversary ࣛ is allowed to issue the following queries in 
any order: 
ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁ሺ݅ሻ: This allows ࣛ to ask the τ to set up a new participant ݅with identity ܫܦ௜ . On 
receiving such a query, the τ generates the private/public key pair for ݅. 
ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܲܽݎݐ݈݅ܽܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܭ݁ݕሺ݅ሻ: the τ  responds with ݅’s partial private key. 
ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܸ݈݁ܽݑ݁ሺ݅ሻ : the τ responds with ݅ ’s secret value ݔ௜  that corresponds to its 
certificateless public key. If the τ  has been asked the replace public key query before, it 
responds with ⊥. 
ܴ݁݌݈ܽܿ݁ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿܭ݁ݕሺ݅, ݌݇ሻ: Party’s certificateless public key is replaced with ݌݇ chosen by 
the adversary. Party ݅ will use the new public key for all communication and computation. 
ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܧ݌݄݁݉݁ݎ݈ܽܭ݁ݕሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻ : the τ responds with the ephemeral secret used in session 
ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܯܽݏݐ݁ݎܭ݁ݕ: The adversary is given access to the master secret key. 
ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܵ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܭ݁ݕሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻ: If the session has not been accepted, it returns ⊥,otherwise it 
reveals the accepted session key. 
ܵ݁݊݀ሺ∏ ,݉௧௜,௝ ሻ: If the session ∏௧௜,௝  does not exist, it will be created as initiator at party ݅ if 
݉  ൌ  ߣ, or as a responder at party ݆, otherwise. If theparticipating parties have not been initiated 
before, the respective private and public keys are created. Upon receiving the message ݉, the 
protocol is executed. After party ݅ has sent and received the last set of messages specified by the 
protocol, it outputs a decision indicating accepting or rejecting the session. In the case of one-
round protocols, party i behaves as follows: 
݉ ൌ ߣ: Party ݅ generates an ephemeral value and responds with an outgoing message only 
and a decision indicating acceptance or rejection of the session. 
݉ ് ߣ: If party ݅ is a responder, it generates an ephemeral value for thesession and responds 
with an outgoing message and a decision indicating acceptance or rejection of the session. In 
this work, we require݅ ് ݆, i.e. a party will not run a session with itself. 
Once the adversary ࣛ  decides that the first phase is over, it starts the second phase by 
choosing a fresh session ∏௧௜,௝  and issuing a ܶ݁ݏݐሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻ query, where the fresh session and 
ܶ݁ݏݐ query are defined as follows. 
Definition 3 (Fresh session): A session∏௧௜,௝ is fresh if 
¾ ∏௧௜,௝ has accepted; 
¾ ∏௧௜,௝ is unopened(not being issued the session key reveal query); 
¾ The session state at neither party participating in this session is fully corrupted; 
¾ There is no opened session ∏௟௝,௜ which has a matching conversation to ∏௧௜,௝ . 
ܶ݁ݏݐሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻ: At some point, ࣛ may choose one of the oracles, say ∏௧௜,௝ , to aska single 
ܶ݁ݏݐ  query. This oracle must be fresh. If ܾ ൌ 0 , the adversary is given the session key, 
otherwise it randomly samples a session key from the distribution of valid session keys and 
returns it to the adversary. 
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After the ܶ݁ݏݐሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻquery, ࣛ  can continue to query except that the test session ∏௧௜,௝  
should remain fresh. We emphasize here that partial corruption is allowed as this is a benefit of 
our security model. Additionally, ܴ݁݌݈ܽܿ݁ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿܭ݁ݕ queries may be issued to any party after 
the test session has been completed. 
At the end of the game, ࣛ must output a guess bit ܾᇱ. ࣛ wins if and only if ܾᇱ ൌ ܾ. ࣛ’s 
advantage in winning the above game is defined as: 
ܣ݀ݒࣛሺ݇ሻ ൌ ቚPrሺܾᇱ ൌ ܾሻ െ
ଵ
ଶ
ቚ. 
 Definition 4. A CTAKA protocol is said to be secure if: 
¾ In the presence of a benign adversary on ∏௧௜,௝ and ∏௨௝,௜ , both oracles always agree 
on the same session key, and this key is distributed uniformly atrandom. 
¾ For any adversary ࣛ א ሼࣛଵ,ࣛଶሽ, ܣ݀ݒࣛሺ݇ሻ is negligible. 
 
3. Our protocol 
Our protocol also consists of six polynomial-time algorithms. They are described as follows. 
Setup: 
The KGC randomly picksݏ א ܼ௤כ as a master private key and sets its public key ௄ܲீ஼ ൌ ݏ · ܲ. 
For a security parameter ݇, KGC selects two cryptographic secure hash functions ܪଵ: ሼ0,1ሽ௞ ՜
ܼ௤כ, ܪଶ: ሼ0,1ሽכ ൈ ሼ0,1ሽכ ൈ ܩ ൈ ܩ ൈ ܩ ൈ ܩ ՜ ܼ௤כ. 
The KGC publishes ݌ܽݎܽ݉ݏ  ൌ ሼܨ௣, ܧ/ܨ௣, ܩ, ܲ, ௄ܲீ஼, ܪଵ, ܪଶሽas system parameters and secretly 
keeps the master key ݏ. 
Partial-Private-Key-Extract: 
The KGC chooses at random ݎ௜ א ܼ௤כ , computes ܴ௜ ൌ ݎ௜ · ܲ , ݄௜ ൌ ܪଵሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ , ݏ௜ ൌ ݎ௜ ൅
݄௜ݏ  mod ݍand issues user’s partial private keyܦ௜ ൌ ሺݏ௜, ܴ௜ሻto the users with identity ܫܦ௜ through 
secret channel. 
He can validate her private key by checking whether the equation ݏ௜ · ܲ ൌ ܴ௜ ൅ ݄௜ · ௄ܲீ஼ holds. 
The private key is valid if the equation holds and vice versa. 
Set-Secret-Value: 
The user with identity ܫܦ௜ picks randomly ݔ௜ א ܼ௤כ and sets ݔ௜ as his secret value. 
Set-Private-Key: 
The user with identity ܫܦ௜ takes the pair ௜ܵ ൌ ሺݔ௜, ݏ௜ሻ as its private key. 
Set-Public-Key: 
The user with identity ܫܦ௜ takes  ௜ܲ ൌ ݔ௜ · ܲ as itspublic key. 
Key-Agreement: 
Each user ܣ, ܤ: 
¾ User Keys and Message Exchange 
9 ܣ 
z chooses a random number ݐ஺ א ܼ௤כ and computes ஺ܶ ൌ ݐ஺ · ܲ. 
z sends ܯଵ ൌ ሺܫܦ஺, ܴ஺, ஺ܶሻto ܤ. 
9 ܤ 
z chooses a random numberݐ஻ א ܼ௤כand computes ஻ܶ ൌ ݐ஻ · ܲ. 
z sends ܯଶ ൌ ሺܫܦ஻, ܴ஻, ஻ܶሻ to ܣ. 
¾ Key Computation 
For two parties ܣ and ܤ: 
9 Upon receiving ܯଶ from ܤ, ܣ computes 
z ݑ஺ ൌ ݔ஺ ൅ ݏ஺ ൅ ݐ஺ 
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z ஻ܹ ൌ ܴ஻ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஻, ܴ஻ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ 
z ܭ஺஻ଵ ൌ ݑ஺ · ሺ ஻ܲ ൅ ஻ܹሻ 
z ܭ஺஻ଶ ൌ ݑ஺ · ሺ ஻ܶ ൅ ஻ܹሻ 
z ܵܭ஺஻ ൌ ܪଶሺܫܦ஺||ܫܦ஻|| ஺ܶ|| ஻ܶ||ܭ஺஻ଵ ||ܭ஺஻ଶ ሻ 
9 Upon receiving ܯଵ from ܣ, ܤ computes 
z ஺ܹ ൌ ஺ܲ ൅ ܴ஺ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஺, ܴ஺ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ ൅ ஺ܶ 
z ܭ஻஺ଵ ൌ ሺݔ஻ ൅ ݏ஻ሻ · ஺ܹ 
z ܭ஻஺ଶ ൌ ሺݐ஻ ൅ ݏ஻ሻ · ஺ܹ 
z ܵܭ஻஺ ൌ ܪଶሺܫܦ஺||ܫܦ஻|| ஺ܶ|| ஻ܶ||ܭ஻஺ଵ ||ܭ஻஺ଶ ሻ 
 
 
 
஺ܶ ൌ ݐ஺ · ܲ ஻ܶ ൌ ݐ஻ · ܲ 
ܯଵ ൌ ሺܫܦ஺, ܴ஺, ஺ܶሻ 
ܯଶ ൌ ሺܫܦ஻, ܴ஻, ஻ܶሻ 
ݑ஺ ൌ ݔ஺ ൅ ݏ஺ ൅ ݐ஺ 
஻ܹ ൌ ܴ஻ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஻, ܴ஻ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ ஺ܹ ൌ ஺ܲ ൅ ܴ஺ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஺, ܴ஺ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ ൅ ஺ܶ 
ܭ஺஻ଵ ൌ ݑ஺ · ሺ ஻ܲ ൅ ஻ܹሻܭ஻஺ଵ ൌ ሺݔ஻ ൅ ݏ஻ሻ · ஺ܹ 
ܭ஺஻ଶ ൌ ݑ஺ · ሺ ஻ܶ ൅ ஻ܹሻܭ஻஺ଶ ൌ ሺݐ஻ ൅ ݏ஻ሻ · ஺ܹ 
ܵܭ஺஻ ൌ ܪଶሺܫܦ஺||ܫܦ஻|| ஺ܶ|| ஻ܶ||ܭ஺஻ଵ ||ܭ஺஻ଶ ሻܵܭ஻஺ ൌ ܪଶሺܫܦ஺||ܫܦ஻|| ஺ܶ|| ஻ܶ||ܭ஻஺ଵ ||ܭ஻஺ଶ ሻ 
 
Fig.1. Key agreement of our protocol 
 
The shared secrets agree because: 
஺ܶ ൌ ݐ஺ · ܲ,    ஺ܲ ൌ ݔ஺ · ܲ,    ݏ஺ · ܲ ൌ ܴ஺ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஺, ܴ஺ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ 
஻ܶ ൌ ݐ஻ · ܲ,    ஻ܲ ൌ ݔ஻ · ܲ,   ݏ஻ · ܲ ൌ ܴ஻ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஻, ܴ஻ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ 
ݑ஺ ൌ ݔ஺ ൅ ݏ஺ ൅ ݐ஺ 
஻ܹ ൌ ܴ஻ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஻, ܴ஻ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ 
ܭ஺஻ଵ ൌ ݑ஺ · ሺ ஻ܲ ൅ ஻ܹሻ ൌ ݑ஺ · ሺ ஻ܲ ൅ ܴ஻ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஻, ܴ஻ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ሻ
ൌ ሺݔ஺ ൅ ݏ஺ ൅ ݐ஺ሻሺݔ஻ ൅ ݏ஻ሻ · ܲ 
=ሺݔ஻ ൅ ݏ஻ሻ · ሺ ஺ܲ ൅ ܴ஺ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஺, ܴ஺ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ ൅ ஺ܶሻ ൌ ሺݔ஻ ൅ ݏ஻ሻ · ஺ܹ ൌ ܭ஻஺ଵ  
and 
ܭ஺஻ଶ ൌ ݑ஺ · ሺ ஻ܶ ൅ ஻ܹሻ ൌ ݑ஺ · ሺ ஻ܶ ൅ ܴ஻ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஻, ܴ஻ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ሻ
ൌ ሺݔ஺ ൅ ݏ஺ ൅ ݐ஺ሻሺݐ஻ ൅ ݏ஻ሻ · ܲ 
=ሺݐ஻ ൅ ݏ஻ሻ · ሺ ஺ܲ ൅ ܴ஺ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ஺, ܴ஺ሻ · ௄ܲீ஼ ൅ ஺ܶሻ ൌ ሺݐ஻ ൅ ݏ஻ሻ · ஺ܹ ൌ ܭ஻஺ଶ  
Thus, the agreed session keys for A and B can be computed as: 
ܵܭ஺஻ ൌ ܪଶሺܫܦ஺||ܫܦ஻|| ஺ܶ|| ஻ܶ||ܭ஺஻ଵ ||ܭ஺஻ଶ ሻ ൌ ܪଶሺܫܦ஺||ܫܦ஻|| ஺ܶ|| ஻ܶ||ܭ஻஺ଵ ||ܭ஻஺ଶ ሻ ൌ ܵܭ஻஺ ൌ ܵܭ 
The correctness of the protocol is proved. 
 
4. Security Analysis 
To prove the security of our protocol in the random oracle model, we assume ܪଵ and ܪଶ as 
two random oracles [18]. For security analysis we use proof method of the reference [19]. 
 
Theorem 1. If it is difficult to solve the GDH problem, we can neglect the advantage of a 
type 1 adversary against our protocol. 
Proof: Suppose that there is a type 1 adversary ࣛଵ who can win the game defined in the 
section 2 with a non-negligible advantage ܣ݀ݒࣛభሺ݇ሻ in polynomial-time t. Then we will show 
A B 
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how to use the ability of ࣛଵ to construct an algorithm τ to solve the GDH problem. The τ first 
chooses ଴ܲ אோ ܩ as ௄ܲீ஼ , selects the system parameter ݌ܽݎܽ݉ݏ  ൌ ሼܨ௣, ܧ/ܨ௣ , ܩ, ܲ, ௄ܲீ஼, ܪଵ,
ܪଶሽ and sends ݌ܽݎܽ݉ݏto ࣛଵ. 
Let ݊଴ be the maximum number of sessions that any one party may have. Assume that the 
adversary ࣛଵ activates at most ݊ଵdistinctive honest parties and activates at most ݊ଶdistinctive 
hash queries. 
Assume also that ܣ݀ݒࣛభሺ݇ሻ is non-negligible. Since ܪଵ,  ܪଶ are modeledas a random oracle, 
after the adversary issues the test query, it has only three possible ways to distinguish the tested 
session key from a random string: 
CASE 1.Guessing attack: ࣛଵ guesses correctly the session key. 
CASE2.Key-replication attack: The adversary ࣛଵ forces a non-matching session to have the 
same session key with the test session. In this case, the adversary ࣛଵ  can simply learn the 
session key by querying the non-matching session. 
CASE 3.Forging attack: Assume that ∏்ூ,௃  is the test session. At some point in its run, the 
adversary ࣛଵ  queries ܪଶ in the test session owned by I communicating with J. Clearly, ࣛଵ 
computes the values of ܭூ௃ଵ  and ܭூ௃ଶ  in this case. 
Since  ܪଶ is a random oracle, the probability of guessing the output of  ܪଶ is ሺ1 2௞ൗ ሻ, which is 
negligible. 
The input to the key derivation function ܪଶincludes all information that can uniquely identify 
the matching sessions. Since two non-matching sessions cannot have the same identities and the 
same ephemeral public keys and ܪଶ is modeled as a random oracle, the success probability of 
the Key-replication attack is also negligible. Thus Guessing attack and Key-replication attack 
can be ruled out, and the rest of the proof is mainly devoted to the analysis of the Forging 
attack. As the attack that the adversary ࣛଵ  mounts is the forging attack, ࣛଵ  cannot get an 
advantage in winning the game against the protocol unless it queries the ܪଶ oracle on the session 
key. To relate the advantage of the adversary ࣛଵ against our protocol to theGDH assumption, 
we use a classical reduction approach. In the following, a challenger τ is interested to use the 
adversary ࣛଵ  to turn ࣛଵ’s advantage indistinguishing the tested session key from a random 
string into an advantage in solving the GDH problem. Let ܣ݀ݒீ஽ுሺ݇ሻ be the advantage that the 
challenger τ  gets in solving the GDH problem given the security parameter ݇. To solve the 
GDH problem using ࣛଵ , the τis given a GDH challenge ܷ ൌ ݑ · ܲ, ܸ ൌ ݒ · ܲ  and an oracle 
ܦܦܪሺכ,כ,כሻ , where ݑ, ݒ א ܼ௤כ , and the τ ’s task is to computeܩܦܪሺܷ, ܸሻ ൌ ݑݒ · ܲ . The τ 
simulates the game outlined in the section 2. During the game, the τ has to answer all queries of 
the adversary ࣛଵ. Before the game starts, the τ tries to guess the test session and the strategy 
that the adversary ࣛଵ  will adopt.ࣛଵ  randomly selects ܶ א ሼ1,2,ڮ݊଴ሽ   and two indexes 
ܫ, ܬ  א ሼ1, … , ݊ ሽ: ܫ ് ܬ , which represent the ܫ -th and the ܬ -th distinct honest party that the 
adversary initially chooses. And then the τ determines the test session∏்ூ,௃ , which is correct 
with probability larger than1 ݊଴݊ଵଶൗ
 . 
Let ∏்ூ,௃ be the matching session of ∏௅௃,ூ .The following two sub-cases should be 
considered. 
CASE 3.1: The test session has a matching session owned by another honest party. 
CASE 3.2: No honest party owns a matching session to the testsession. 
▲ The Analysis of CASE 3.1 
The strongest adversary is allowed to corrupt at most two out of three secrets for each party as 
follows: 
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z ݔூ: the user ܫ’s secret value; 
z ݏூ: the part of the user ܫ’s partial private key; 
z ݐூ: the user ܫ’s ephemeral private key. 
This gives to the adversary nine possibilities, called strategies (Lippold et al.[5]), to break the 
protocol. In Lippold et al. [5] ࣛ has 9 stratgies as follows: 
CASE 3.1.1: ࣛ may neither ݔூnor ݔ௃. 
CASE 3.1.2: ࣛ may neither ݐூnor ݐ௃. 
CASE 3.1.3: ࣛmay neitherݔூnorݐ௃. 
CASE 3.1.4: ࣛ may neither ݐூnor ݔ௃. 
CASE 3.1.5:ࣛ may neither ݏூnor ݔ௃. 
CASE 3.1.6: ࣛ may neither ݔூnor ݏ௃. 
CASE 3.1.7: ࣛmay neither ݏூnor ݐ௃. 
CASE 3.1.8: ࣛmay neither ݐூnor ݏ௃. 
CASE 3.1.9: ࣛmay neither ݏூnor ݏ௃. 
Weshould provide the proof of CASE 3.1.2,CASE3.1.7,CASE 3.1.8andCASE 3.1.9 as ࣛ is 
type 1 adversaryࣛଵ. 
The Analysis of CASE 3.1.2 
The τ answers ࣛଵ’s queries as follows. 
¾ ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁ሺ݅ሻ: the τ maintains an initially empty listܮ௖: ሺܫܦ௜, ݏ௜, ܴ௜, ݔ௜, ௜ܲሻ. The τ chooses 
three random numbersݏ௜, ݄௜, ݔ௜ א ܼ௤כ ,computes ܴ௜ ൌ ݏ௜ · ܲ െ ݄௜ · ଴ܲ,    ௜ܲ ൌ ݔ௜ · ܲ, 
sets ܪଵሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ ՚ ݄௜ and stores ሺܫܦ௜, ݏ௜, ܴ௜, ݔ௜, ௜ܲሻ and ሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜, ݄௜ሻ  in ܮ௖  and ܮுభ 
seperately. 
¾ ܪଵሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ: the τ maintains an initially empty list ܮுభ: ܪଵሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ.If ሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ is on the 
ܮுభ, the τ returns ݄௜. Otherwise, the τ randomly pick ݄௜ א ܼ௤
כs, stores ሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜, ݄௜ሻ 
in ܮுభ and returns ݄௜. 
¾ ܪଶሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ , ܼଵ, ܼଶ, ܵܭሻ: the τ maintains an initially empty list ܮுమ: ሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , 
௝ܶ , ܼଵ, ܼଶ, ܵܭሻ . If ሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ ,כ,כ,כሻ is in the list ܮுమ ,the τ  responds ܵܭ . 
Otherwise, the τ responds to these queries in the following way: 
9 The τ looks the list ܮୱ for entry ሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ ,כሻ. If the τ finds the entry, he computes 
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦூ 
௝ܹ ൌ ௝ܴ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ௝, ௝ܴሻ · ଴ܲ 
ܼଵതതത ൌ ܼଵ െ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݏ௜ሻ · ൫ ௝ܲ ൅ ௝ܹ൯ െ ݏ௝ · ௜ܶ 
ܼଶതതത ൌ ܼଶ െ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݏ௜ሻ · ൫ ௝ܶ ൅ ௝ܹ൯ െ ݏ௝ · ௜ܶ 
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦ௃ 
௝ܹ ൌ ௝ܲ ൅ ௝ܴ ൅ ܪଵ൫ܫܦ௝, ௝ܴ൯ · ଴ܲ ൅ ௝ܶ 
ܼଵതതത ൌ ܼଵ 
ܼଶതതത ൌ ܼଶ െ ݏ௜ · ௝ܹ െ ݏ௜ · ௝ܶ 
9 Then the τ  checks whether ܼௗതതത, ݀ ൌ 1,2   is correct by checking whether the oracle 
DDHሺכ,כ,כሻ  outputs 1 when the tuple ሺכ,כ, ܼௗതതതሻ,   ݀ ൌ 1,2, i.e.൫ ௜ܶ, ௝ܶ , ܼଵതതത൯ is inputted. If 
ܼଵ, ܼଶ are correct, the τ stores the tuple ሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ , ܼଵ, ܼଶ, ܵܭሻ into ܮுమ, where the 
value ܵܭ comes from ܮ௦. Otherwise, the τ chooses a random numberܵܭ א ሼ0,1ሽ௞ and 
stores the tupleሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ , ܼଵ, ܼଶ, ܵܭሻ into ܮுమ. 
¾ ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܲܽݎݐ݈݅ܽܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܭ݁ݕሺ݅ሻ:the τ looks up the list ܮ஼ and returns the corresponding 
ܦ௜ to the adversary ࣛଵ. 
10 | P a g e     Yong-Jin Kim , Yong-Min Kim ,  Yong-Jin Choe  and  Hyong-Chol O 
 
¾ ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܸ݈݁ܽݑ݁ሺ݅ሻ: theτ looks up the list ܮ஼ for entry ሺܫܦ௜,כ,כ,כ,כሻ. If the  τ find 
the entry, he returns ݔ௜ . Otherwise, the τ carries out the query ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁ሺ݅ሻ and 
returns the corresponding ݔ௜. 
¾ ܴ݁݌݈ܽܿ݁ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿܭ݁ݕሺ݅, ݌݇ሻ: the τ looks up the list ܮ஼ for entry ሺܫܦ௜,כ,כ,כ,כሻ. If the τ find 
the entry, he replaces ݔ௜  and ௜ܲ with ݔ௜ᇱ, ௜ܲᇱ , where ݌݇ ൌ   ௜ܲᇱ, ௜ܲᇱ ൌ ݔ௜ᇱ · ܲ . 
Otherwise, the τ  carries out the query ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁ሺ݅ሻ  and replaces ݔ௜  and ௜ܲ with 
ݔ௜
ᇱ, ௜ܲ
ᇱ. 
¾ ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܧ݌݄݁݉݁ݎ݈ܽܭ݁ݕሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻ 
9 If ∏௧௜,௝ ൌ ∏்ூ,௃ and∏௧௜,௝ ൌ ∏௅௃,ூ , then the τ stops the simulation. 
9 Otherwise the τ returns the stored ephemeral private key to ࣛଵ. 
¾ ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܯܽݏݐ݁ݎܭ݁ݕ : the τ stops the simulation. 
¾ ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܵ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܭ݁ݕሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻ: 
9 If ∏௧௜,௝ ൌ ∏்ூ,௃ or ∏௧௜,௝ ൌ ∏௅௃,ூ , then the τ stops the simulation. 
9 Otherwise the τ returns the session key to ࣛଵ. 
¾ ܵ݁݊݀ሺ∏ ,݉ ௧௜,௝ ሻ: the τ maintains an initially empty listܮୱ: ሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ , ܵܭሻ. 
9 If ∏௧௜,௝ ൌ ∏்ூ,௃ , then the τ returns ௜ܶ ൌ ܷ to ࣛଵ. 
9 If ∏௧௜,௝ ൌ ∏௅௃,ூ ,then the τ returns ௝ܶ ൌ ܸto ࣛଵ. 
9 Otherwise, the τ  replies according to the specification of the protocol. 
¾ ܶ݁ݏݐሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻ:the τ answers ࣛଵ’s queries as follows. 
9 If∏௧௜,௝ ് ∏்ூ,௃ ,the τ stops the simulation. 
9 Otherwise, the τ generates a random number ܵܭ א ሼ0,1ሽ௞ and returns it to ࣛଵ. 
 
As the attack that adversary ࣛଵ  mounts the forging attack, if ࣛଵ succeeds, it must have 
queried oracle ܪଶ on the form as follows.  
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦூ 
ݑ௜ ൌ ݔ௜ ൅ ݏ௜ ൅ ݐ௜ 
௝ܹ ൌ ௝ܴ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ௝, ௝ܴሻ · ଴ܲ 
ܼଵ ൌ ݑ௜ · ሺ ௝ܲ ൅ ௝ܹሻ 
ܼଶ ൌ ݑ௜ · ሺܸ ൅ ௝ܹሻ 
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦ௃ 
௝ܹ ൌ ௝ܲ ൅ ௝ܴ ൅ ܪଵ൫ܫܦ௝, ௝ܴ൯ · ଴ܲ ൅ ܷ 
ܼଵ ൌ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݏ௜ሻ · ௝ܹ 
ܼଶ ൌ ሺݐ௜ ൅ ݏ௜ሻ · ௝ܹ . 
Here ௜ܶ ൌ ܷ is the outgoing message of test session by thesimulator and ௝ܶ ൌ ܸ is the incoming 
message from the adversary ࣛଵ . To solve ܩܦܪሺܷ, ܸሻ, for all entries inܮுమ , the τ randomly 
picks one entry with the probability ଵ
௡మ
 and the τ proceeds with following steps: The τ computes 
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦூ 
ܼଶതതത ൌ ܼଶ െ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݏ௜ሻ · ൫ܸ ൅ ௝ܹ൯ െ ݏ௝ · ܷ ൌ ܩܦܪሺܷ, ܸሻ 
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦ௃ 
௝ܹ ൌ ௝ܲ ൅ ௝ܴ ൅ ܪଵ൫ܫܦ௝, ௝ܴ൯ · ଴ܲ ൅ ܷ 
ܼଶതതത ൌ ܼଶ െ ݏ௜ · ௝ܹ െ ݔ௝ · ܷ ൌ ܩܦܪሺܷ, ܸሻ and  returns ܼଶതതത as  the  solution 
to ܩܦܪሺܷ, ܸሻ. 
The advantage of the  τ solving GDH problem satisfies 
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ܣ݀ݒఛீ஽ுሺ݇ሻ ൒
ଵ
ଽ௡బ௡భ
మ௡మ
 ܣ݀ݒࣛభሺ݇ሻ. 
Then ܣ݀ݒఛீ஽ுሺ݇ሻ is non-negligible since we assume that ܣ݀ݒࣛభሺ݇ሻ is non-negligible. This 
contradicts the GDH assumption. 
CASE3.1.7, CASE 3.1.8 and CASE 3.1.9 can be solved by the similar method. 
▲ The Analysis of CASE 3.2 
Through the definition of the freshness, the following two cases should be considered. 
CASE 3.2.1: At some point, the static private key owned by the party ܫ has been revealed by 
the adversary ࣛଵ  (Note that in this case, according to the freshness definition, ࣛଵ  is not 
permitted to reveal ephemeral private key of the test session). 
This case can be solved by the same method in the CASE 3.1.8. 
CASE 3.2.2: The static private key owned by the party ܫ has never been revealed by the 
adversaryࣛଵ. (Note that in this case, according to the freshness definition, ࣛଵ may reveal party 
ܫ’s ephemeral private key in the test session.) 
This case can be solved by the same method in the CASE 3.1.7. 
If the adversary ࣛଵ succeeds with non-negligible probability in any case above, we can also 
solve the GDH problem with non-negligible probability, which contradicts the assumed security 
of GDH problem. So we can conclude that our scheme bases its security on GDH problem. 
  
 
Theorem 2.If it is difficult to solve the GDH problem,we can neglect the advantage of a type 
2 adversary against our protocol. 
Proof: Suppose that there is a type 2 adversary ࣛଶ who can win the game defined in the 
section 2 with a non-negligible advantage ܣ݀ݒࣛమሺ݇ሻ in polynomial-time t.  
▲ The Analysis of CASE 3.1 
Through the definition of the freshness, we should provide the proof of CASE 3.1.1, 
CASE3.1.2, CASE3.1.3 and CASE3.1.4 as ࣛ is type 2 adversary ࣛଶ. 
The Analysis of CASE 3.1.1 
A challenger τ answers ࣛଶ’s queries as follows. 
¾ ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁ሺ݅ሻ: the τ maintains an initially empty listܮ௖: ሺܫܦ௜, ݏ௜, ܴ௜, ݔ௜, ௜ܲሻ. 
If ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦூ , the τ chooses two random numbers ݎ௜, ݄௜ א ܼ௤כ , computes ܴ௜ ൌ ݎ௜ ·
ܲ, ௜ܲ ൌ ܷ , ݏ௜ ൌ ݎ௜ ൅ ݄௜ݏ mod ݍ sets ܪଵሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ ՚ ݄௜ and stores ሺܫܦ௜, ݏ௜, ܴ௜, ٣
, ௜ܲሻ and ሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜, ݄௜ሻ  in ܮ௖  and ܮுభ  seperately. Otherwise, if ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦ௃ , the τ 
chooses two random numbers ݎ௜, ݄௜ א ܼ௤כ , computes ܴ௜ ൌ ݎ௜ · ܲ, ௜ܲ ൌ V, ݏ௜ ൌ ݎ௜ ൅
݄௜ݏ mod ݍ, sets ܪଵሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ ՚ ݄௜and storesሺܫܦ௜, ݏ௜, ܴ௜, ٣, ௜ܲሻ and ሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜, ݄௜ሻ in ܮ௖ 
and ܮுభ  seperately. Otherwise, the τ  chooses three random numbers ݏ௜, ݄௜, ݔ௜ א
ܼ௤כ ,computes ܴ௜ ൌ ݎ௜ · ܲ, ௜ܲ ൌ ݔ௜ · ܲ, ݏ௜ ൌ ݎ௜ ൅ ݄௜ݏ mod ݍ ,sets ܪଵሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ ՚
݄௜and storesሺܫܦ௜, ݏ௜, ܴ௜, ݔ௜, ௜ܲሻandሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜, ݄௜ሻ in ܮ௖ and ܮுభ seperately. 
¾ ܪଵሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ: the τ maintains an initially empty listܮுభ: ܪଵሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ. 
If ሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜ሻ is in the list ܮுభ, the τ returns ݄௜. Otherwise, the τ randomly picks݄௜ א
ܼ௤כ, stores ሺܫܦ௜, ܴ௜, ݄௜ሻ in ܮுభ and returns ݄௜. 
¾ ܪଶሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ , ܼଵ, ܼଶ, ܵܭሻ: theτmaintains an initially empty list ܮுమ: ሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ ,  
௝ܶ , ܼଵ, ܼଶ, ܵܭሻ. If ሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ ,כ,כ,כሻ is in the listܮுమ, the τ respondsܵܭ. Otherwise, 
the τ responds to these queries in the following way: 
9 The τ looks the list ܮୱ for entryሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ ,כሻ. If τ finds the entry, he computes 
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦூ 
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௝ܹ ൌ ௝ܴ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ௝, ௝ܴሻ · ଴ܲ 
ܼଵതതത ൌ ܼଵ െ ሺݏ௜ ൅ ݐ௜ሻ · ൫ ௝ܲ ൅ ௝ܹ൯ െ ݏ௝ · ௜ܲ 
ܼଶതതത ൌ ܼଶ െ ሺݏ௜ ൅ ݐ௜ሻ · ൫ ௝ܶ ൅ ௝ܹ൯ െ ݐ௝ · ௜ܲ 
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦ௃ 
௝ܹ ൌ ௝ܲ ൅ ௝ܴ ൅ ܪଵ൫ܫܦ௝, ௝ܴ൯ · ଴ܲ ൅ ௝ܶ 
ܼଵതതത ൌ ܼଵ െ ݏ௜ · ௝ܹ െ ሺݏ௝ ൅ ݐ௝ሻ · ௜ܲ 
ܼଶതതത ൌ ܼଵ 
9 Then the τ checks whether ܼௗതതത, ݀ ൌ 1,2  is correct by checking whether the oracle 
ܦܦܪሺכ,כ,כሻ outputs 1 when the tupleሺכ,כ, ܼௗതതതሻ,i.e.൫ ௜ܲ, ௝ܲ , ܼଵതതത൯ is inputted. If ܼଵ, ܼଶ 
are correct, the τ  stores the tuple ሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ , ܼଵ, ܼଶ, ܵܭሻ  intoܮுమ , where the 
value SK comes from ܮ௦. Otherwise, the τ chooses a random number ܵܭ א ሼ0,1ሽ௞ 
and stores the tupleሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ , ܼଵ, ܼଶ, ܵܭሻ into ܮுమ. 
¾ ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܲܽݎݐ݈݅ܽܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܭ݁ݕሺ݅ሻ :the τ  looks up the list ܮ஼  and returns the 
corresponding ܦ௜to the adversaryࣛଶ. 
¾ ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܵ݁ܿݎ݁ݐܸ݈݁ܽݑ݁ሺ݅ሻ: the τ looks up the list ܮ஼ for entry ሺܫܦ௜,כ,כ,כ,כሻ. 
9 If ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦூor ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦ௃. The τ stops the simulation. 
9 Otherwise, If the τ find the entry, he returns ݔ௜. Otherwise, the  τ carries out the 
query ܥݎ݁ܽݐ݁ሺ݅ሻ and returns the corresponding ݔ௜. 
¾ ܴ݁݌݈ܽܿ݁ܲݑܾ݈݅ܿܭ݁ݕሺ݅, ݌݇ሻ: the τ stops the simulation. 
¾ ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܧ݌݄݁݉݁ݎ݈ܽܭ݁ݕሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻ 
9 If ∏௧௜,௝ ് ∏்ூ,௃ and∏௧௜,௝ ് ∏௅௃,ூ , then the τ stops the simulation. 
9 Otherwise the τ returns the stored ephemeral private key to ࣛଶ. 
¾ ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܯܽݏݐ݁ݎܭ݁ݕ : the τ returns the master key ࣛଶ. 
¾ ܴ݁ݒ݈݁ܽܵ݁ݏݏ݅݋݊ܭ݁ݕሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻ: 
9 If ∏௧௜,௝ ൌ ∏்ூ,௃ or ∏௧௜,௝ ൌ ∏௅௃,ூ , then the τ stops the simulation. 
9 Otherwise the τ returns the session key to ࣛଶ. 
¾ ܵ݁݊݀ሺ∏ ,݉௧௜,௝ ሻ: the τ maintains an initial empty listܮୱ: ሺܫܦ௜, ܫܦ௝, ௜ܶ , ௝ܶ , ܵܭሻ. 
9 If ∏௧௜,௝ ൌ ∏்ூ,௃ , then the τ returns ௜ܲ ൌ ܷ to ࣛଶ. 
9 If ∏௧௜,௝ ൌ ∏௅௃,ூ , then the τ returns ௝ܲ ൌ ܸ to ࣛଶ. 
9 Otherwise, the τ replies according to the specification of the protocol. 
¾ ܶ݁ݏݐሺ∏௧௜,௝ ሻ:the τ answers ࣛଶ’s queries as follows. 
9 If ∏௧௜,௝ ് ∏்ூ,௃ , the τ stops the simulation. 
9 Otherwise, the τ generates a random number ܵܭ א ሼ0,1ሽ௞ and returns it to ࣛଶ. 
As the attack that adversary ࣛଶ  mounts the forging attack, if ࣛଶ succeeds, it must have 
queried oracle ܪଶ on the form as follows.  
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦூ 
ݑ௜ ൌ ݔ௜ ൅ ݏ௜ ൅ ݐ௜ 
௝ܹ ൌ ௝ܴ ൅ ܪଵሺܫܦ௝, ௝ܴሻ · ଴ܲ 
ܼଵ ൌ ݑ௜ · ሺܸ ൅ ௝ܹሻ 
ܼଶ ൌ ݑ௜ · ሺ ௝ܶ ൅ ௝ܹሻ 
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦ௃ 
௝ܹ ൌ ܷ ൅ ௝ܴ ൅ ܪଵ൫ܫܦ௝, ௝ܴ൯ · ଴ܲ ൅ ௝ܶ 
ܼଵ ൌ ሺݔ௜ ൅ ݏ௜ሻ · ௝ܹ 
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ܼଶ ൌ ሺݐ௜ ൅ ݏ௜ሻ · ௝ܹ. 
Here ௜ܲ ൌ ܷ is the outgoing message of test session by the simulator and ௝ܲ ൌ ܸ is the incoming 
message from the adversary ࣛଶ. 
 Tosolve ܩܦܪሺܷ, ܸሻ, for all entries in ܮுమrandomly picks one entry with the probability. 
The advantage of the τ solving GDH problem with the advantage ଵ
௡మ
 and the τ proceeds with 
following steps: the τ computes 
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦூ 
ܼଵതതത ൌ ܼଵ െ ሺݏ௜ ൅ ݐ௜ሻ · ൫ܸ ൅ ௝ܹ൯ െ ݏ௝ · ܷ 
 ܫܦ௜ ൌ ܫܦூ 
௝ܹ ൌ ܷ ൅ ௝ܴ ൅ ܪଵ൫ܫܦ௝, ௝ܴ൯ · ଴ܲ ൅ ௝ܶ 
ܼଵതതത ൌ ܼଵ െ ݏ௜ · ௝ܹ െ ൫ݏ௝ ൅ ݐ௝൯ · ܸ ൌ ܩܦܪሺܷ, ܸሻ and returns ܼଵതതത as the solution 
to ܩܦܪሺܷ, ܸሻ. 
The advantage of the τ solving GDH problem satisfies 
ܣ݀ݒఛீ஽ுሺ݇ሻ ൒
ଵ
ଽ௡బ௡భ
మ௡మ
ܣ݀ݒࣛమሺ݇ሻ. 
Then ܣ݀ݒఛீ஽ுሺ݇ሻ is non-negligible since we assume that ܣ݀ݒࣛమሺ݇ሻ is non-negligible. This 
contradicts the GDH assumption. 
The CASE 3.1.2, CASE 3.1.3 and CASE 3.1.4 can be solved by the similar method. 
▲ The Analysis of CASE 3.2 
Through the definition of the freshness, the following two cases should be considered. 
CASE 3.2.1: At some point, the secret value owned by the party I has been revealed by the 
adversary ࣛଶ. (Note that in this case, according to the freshness definition, ࣛଶ is not permitted 
to reveal ephemeral private key of the test session.) 
This case can be solved through the same method in the CASE 3.1.4. 
CASE 3.2.2: The secret value owned by the party ܫhas never been revealed by the adversary 
ࣛଶ . (Note that in this case, according to the freshness definition, ࣛଶ  may reveal party ܫ ’s 
ephemeral private key in the test session.) 
This case can be solved through the same method in the CASE 3.1.3. 
If the adversary ࣛଶ succeeds with non-negligible probability in any case above, we can also 
solve the GDH problem with non-negligible probability, which contradicts the assumed security 
of GDH problem. So we can conclude that our scheme bases its security on GDH problem. 
  
 
Proposition1. If two sessions are matching, both of them will be accepted and will get the 
same session key which is distributed uniformly at random in thesession key sample space. 
Proof:From the correction analysis of our protocol in Section 3, we know if two oracles are 
matching, then both of them are accepted and have the same session key. The session keys are 
distributed uniformly sinceݎ஺, ݎ஻ א ܼ௤כ are selected uniformly during the protocol execution. 
  
From the above three theorems and proposition, we can get the following corollary. 
 
Corollary1. Our protocol is a secure CTAKA protocol in the eCK model under the GDH 
assumption. 
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5. Comparison with previous protocols 
For the convenience of evaluating the computational cost, we define some notations as 
follows. 
௠ܶ௨௟: The time of executing a scalar multiplication operation ofpoint. 
௔ܶௗௗ: The time of executing an addition operation of point. 
௜ܶ௡௩:The time of executing a modular invasion operation. 
௛ܶ: The time of executing a one-way hash function. 
We will compare the efficiency of our protocol with six CTAKA protocols without pairings 
i.e. Geng et al.’s protocol [8], Hou et al.’s protocol [9], Yang et al.’s protocol [10] and He et 
al.’s protocols [11,12, 19]. The table 1 shows the comparison between bilinear pairing-free 
CTAKA protocols in terms of efficiency, security model and underlying hardness assumptions. 
Since the scalar multiplication operation of point is more complicated than the addition 
operation of points, modular invasion operation and the hash function operation, then our 
protocol has better performance than Geng et al.’s protocol [8], Hou et al.’s protocol [9] and 
Heetal.’s protocol [11, 12, 19]. Moreover, Geng et al.’s protocol [8], Hou et al.’s protocol [9] , 
Yang et al.’s protocol [10] and He et al.’s protocol [11] are not secure against type adversary. 
Then our protocol has advantage in both the performance and the security over previous ones. It 
is well known that the eCK model is much superior to the mBR model. Then Yang et al.’s 
protocol [10], He et al.’s protocol [19] and our protocol has advantage in security to Geng et 
al.’s protocol [8] , Hou et al.’s protocol [9] and He et al.’s protocol [11, 12]. From the table 1, 
we know our protocol has much better performance than previous ones. We conclude that our 
protocol is more suitable for practical applications. 
Table 1: Comparisons among different protocols 
Protocol Computational amount 
Security 
model Assumption 
Message 
exchange 
Geng(2009),[8] 7 ௠ܶ௨௟ ൅ 2 ௛ܶ mBR GDH 2 
Hou(2009),[9] 6 ௠ܶ௨௟ ൅ 2 ௛ܶ mBR GDH 2 
Yang(2011),[10] 9 ௠ܶ௨௟ ൅ 2 ௛ܶ eCK GDH 2 
He(2012),[11] 5 ௠ܶ௨௟ ൅ ௔ܶௗௗ ൅ ௜ܶ௡௩ ൅ ௛ܶ mBR DCDH 3 
He(2011),[12] 5 ௠ܶ௨௟ ൅ 4 ௔ܶௗௗ ൅ 2 ௛ܶ mBR CDH 2 
He(2011),[19] 5 ௠ܶ௨௟ ൅ 3 ௔ܶௗௗ ൅ 2 ௛ܶ eCK GDH 2 
Our Protocol 4 ௠ܶ௨௟ ൅ 3 ௔ܶௗௗ ൅ 2 ௛ܶ eCK GDH 2 
 
6. Conclusion 
We proposed a bilinear pairing-free CTAKA protocol and proved its security in the eCK 
model. 
In this protocol the number of scalar multiplication is 4. 
This protocol has the best performance among related protocols. 
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